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The current Internet presents a high barrier to entry for new service providers, due to its
inability to accommodate new protocols and technologies, and lack of competition among
the network providers. Recently, network virtualization has gained considerable attention
as a possible solution, as it enables multiple networks to concurrently run over a shared
substrate. It allows for deploying diverse network protocols and technologies customized
for specific networked services and applications. Moreover, any party can take on the role
of a network provider by simply offering his virtual network infrastructure to customers,
increasing competition in the market. However, the first challenge in realizing a fair and
competitive market in a virtual network environment is to have a service negotiation and
contracting mechanism in place, that will allow (i) multiple infrastructure providers to
participate in a fair and faithful competition, and (ii) a service provider to negotiate the
price and quality of service with the providers.
In this thesis, we present V-Mart, an open market model and enabling framework for
automated service negotiation and contracting in a virtual network environment. To the
infrastructure providers, V-Mart fosters an open and fair competition realized by a two
stage auction. The V-Mart auction model ensures that bidders (infrastructure providers)
bid truthfully, have the flexibility to apply diverse pricing policies, and still gain profit
from hosting customers’ virtual resources. To the service providers, V-Mart offers virtual
network partitioning algorithms that allow them to divide their virtual networks among
competing infrastructure providers while minimizing the total cost. V-Mart offers two types
of algorithms to suit different market scenarios. The algorithms not only consider virtual
resource hosting price but also the service provider’s preference for resource co-location and
the high cost of inter-provider communication. Through extensive simulation experiments
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Although the Internet has been stunningly successful from its inception, its architecture and
business model pose a high barrier to entry for new and innovative service providers. The
Internet architecture, developed decades ago, has proven its worth by the wide variety of
applications that run on it and the heterogeneity of technologies over which it currently
runs. Nonetheless, many applications and services often find the architecture ill-suited for
their purposes [15,57,30], while some others could benefit from having more control over
the underlying architecture parameters (e.g, packet formats, routing protocols, forwarding
mechanisms and other control and management protocols). But, such flexibility and control is
hard to imagine. Changes to the Internet architecture are limited to mere makeshift solutions
and patches to temporarily handle problems. Anything more disruptive in nature is next to
impossible, as it requires a consensus among multiple stakeholders with different goals and
policies. This is evident from the painstakingly slow and still incomplete deployment of IPv6.
From a business perspective, a major concern is the lack of competition among the
network providers. The role of network provider in the Internet has become the prerogative
of a handful of large companies with big pockets. Service providers have no option but to
select from pre-specified levels of services at a price fixed by the providers. But, ideally, a
service provider would want to negotiate with the network providers for a price based on
the demand, the utility he will derive from it, priority and available budget. Thus, virtual
network hosting service should be rendered at a price that maintains a balance between the
desires of the service provider and the network or infrastructure providers.
Network virtualization has gained considerable attention [15, 57, 28] as a possible
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solution for this stalemate, as it provides the means to concurrently run multiple virtual
networks, each customized for a particular use, on a shared physical substrate. In a Virtual
Network Environment (VNE), the basic entity is a virtual network (VN), which is a logical
topology composed of virtual nodes and virtual links. Provisioning a VN involves the
mapping/embedding of virtual nodes onto physical ones and virtual links onto physical
links or paths. Once provisioned, a VN has the semblance of an actual physical network.
The key to a VNE’s flexibility is the splitting of the traditional Internet Service Provider
(ISP)’s role into two: infrastructure providers (InPs), who are responsible for deploying and
managing the substrate networks, i.e, the underlying physical routers and links, and service
providers (SPs), who synthesize virtual networks by aggregating resources from multiple
infrastructure providers and use them to deploy their services. The decoupling of the ISP’s
role enables service providers to deploy a customized network for his services without the
need to build his own expensive physical infrastructure. Moreover, the role of an InP is no
longer the prerogative of expensive infrastructure owners; a SP can serve as an InP and lease
out virtual resources spawned from his own virtual network. Thus, a VNE offers an overall
open and competitive market, where service providers have a wide variety of infrastructure
providers to lease virtual networks from, while enjoying the flexibility to customize their
virtual networks to best suit their services.
Many research projects have acknowledged the need for virtual network environments
[56,51,3,6,30,49]. And, as major router vendors are beginning to oblige with support for
router virtualization [2] and customized protocols [5,10], the time is imminent, when hosted
virtual networks will be offered as a service, much like computing facilities are offered in a
cloud computing environment.
1.1 Challenges
The realization of a Virtual Network Environment (VNE) is associated with a number of new
technical, service and network management challenges [28].
From the network management perspective, the most significant challenge is an effective
virtual network embedding, which deals with the efficient mapping of virtual resources
to underlying resources of an InP. Other network management aspects like interfacing,
signaling, bootstrapping, failure handling, performance monitoring and security also have
new requirements and complexities in this environment.
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From a service management perspective, it is important to ensure a market environment
where successful customer-provider relations are established between SPs and InPs. A
customer-provider business relation is successful only when service is rendered at the level
of quality desired by the customer and at a price that satisfies the objectives of both parties.
An effective service negotiation and contracting mechanism is required to achieve such an
equilibrium. This is especially true for a VNE, where great business flexibility exists in terms of
which providers (InPs) a SP can contract with. Although it may be possible for a small virtual
network to be fully embedded in a single InP’s infrastructure, it is much less likely for large
inter-continental VNs. Indeed, VNs (e.g, VPNs, overlays) that are spread geographically are
often provisioned among multiple network providers today. With VNE, we can expect a rather
large number of InPs in the market, ranging from traditional underlay network providers
to new 3rd party virtual network providers. Under the current inter-network business
model, a group of collaborative InPs negotiate among themselves to jointly host such a VN;
however, such a business arrangement is not customer-driven, as the VN assignment (among
InPs) does not involve the customer in the negotiation process. Furthermore, it does not
exhibit fair market properties, as it lacks free market competition and does not ensure price
minimization for the customer. But, the aspect of service negotiation and contracting in a
multi-provider scenario remain untouched in this context.
The concept of Network Virtualization is not entirely new. Concepts like P2P services,
VPN, Overlay Networks, Grid Computing, and Cloud computing bear many similarities with
it, as they all allow sharing of physical resources from across the world using virtualization
techniques. Therefore, one might look to these, especially hosted cloud computing for
solutions, given its tremendous recent growth. But, even in cloud computing, service
management and network management in a multiple provider setting are yet to be explored,
because
(i) the concept is fairly new and, therefore, the number of companies offering hosted
cloud computing services is still limited and
(ii) critical IT infrastructures are yet to migrate to these cloud services. So, many manage-
ment issues have not been pushed to the forefront.
However, we feel that the issue cannot be ignored for VNE.
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1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we present V-Mart [61], an open market model and enabling framework
for automated service negotiation and contracting in VNE. To the InPs, V-Mart fosters an
open and fair competition environment through auctioning; and to the SPs, it offers a
customer-driven virtual network partitioning and contracting engine.
With V-Mart, a SP is not required to select from a set of pre-defined levels of services,
rather he can specify his requirements and InPs can respond with offers based on them.
Any willing InP may participate in a two-stage auctioning process, through which the SP
ultimately decides who to contract with. The InPs need not disclose sensitive information
(e.g, their pricing models) to participate in the auction. The first stage of the auction, which
uses the Vickrey Truth Serum, elicits true estimates of virtual resources hosting costs in order
to avoid price manipulations from the InPs. The second stage of the auction uses the results
of the first and finally resolves the auction to decide the winners.
V-Mart offers two types of partitioning algorithms: one deterministic algorithm based
on mathematical formulation of the VN partitioning problem and the other a greedy local
search. The algorithms not only consider virtual node hosting and intra-InP data transfer
price estimates but also the SP’s preference for resource co-location and the high cost of
inter-InP communication. Furthermore, V-Mart’s partitioning algorithms does not impose a
particular pricing model on the InPs, but on the contrary, supports diverse InP pricing policies
ranging from resource-wise pricing to full network package pricing. Through extensive
simulation experiments, we show that the algorithms are fast, efficient, and suited to handle
heterogeneous market conditions and InP pricing models.
Although, V-Mart is designed for the VNE context, it is flexible enough to be applied to
other distributed multi-provider service environments such as Cloud computing, Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA) infrastructures and Business Process Outsourcing.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the concepts that
are pertinent to this thesis and related work. Chapter 3 describes the proposed framework.
In chapter 4, we evaluate the performance of V-Mart’s VN partitioning algorithms through
simulations. We conclude in chapter 5 with a summary of contributions and future plans.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we present the concepts that are relevant to the work presented in this thesis,
and describe related work in literature. We begin in section 2.1 with an introduction to
the virtual network environment, where we delve further into the VNE business model and
identify important business actors and relations that define its economic and market models.
We then explore, in section 2.2, existing work in literature that address service negotiation
and contracting in this context. We conclude this chapter in section 2.3 with a discussion of
service negotiation and contracting in areas that have resemblances with VNE.
2.1 The Virtual Network Environment
In a virtual network environment, the basic entity is a virtual network (VN), which is a
logical topology composed of virtual nodes and virtual links. Provisioning a VN means
mapping/embedding virtual nodes onto physical ones and virtual links onto physical links or
paths. Once provisioned, a VN has the semblance of an actual physical network1.
2.1.1 The Reference Business Model
The VNE business model resembles that of a cloud computing environment, except the
service on offer is hosting virtual networks, rather than offering virtual computing resources.
In this section, we describe the business entities in a VNE and their relations. We focus
1Note that virtual routers are not fixed to the physical routers on which they are mapped; rather, they can
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Figure 2.1: Network Virtualization Environment
primarily on the actors and the relations that are relevant in the design and implementation
of a service negotiation and contracting framework; further details on the business model
can be found in [27,28].
Actors
The VNE is primarily characterized by the decoupling of the traditional Internet Service
Providers’ (ISP) role. Here, the role of the ISP has been split into two [15, 57, 30, 43, 28]:
Infrastructure Providers, and Service Providers. A sample VNE is shown in Figure 2.1, where
the virtual networks 1,2, and 3 are created from physical resources provided by infrastructure
providers 1, 2, and 3.
Infrastructure Provider (InP): Infrastructure providers own and manage physical net-
worked resources, i.e, routers and links that connect the routers. By utilizing virtualization
techniques, an InP can divide his physical resources into multiple logical/virtual ones. De-
pending on a customer’s specifications, e.g, network topology, capacity of the routers and
link bandwidth, an InP can set up a virtual network from a subset of his virtual resources
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and allow the customer full control over them.
Service Provider (SP): Service providers offer services to end users. Here, a SP is no
longer faced with the daunting challenge of setting up an expensive infrastructure customized
to suit his service(s). Rather, he can simply lease virtual networks from InP(s) for the job. A
SP is free to customize his virtual network to his will and implement any routing, naming,
control or management protocol or technology.
This decoupling of the ISP’s role also helps modularize network management tasks
and increase accountability at every layer of networking. InPs will be responsible for the
management and operations of physical entities in the network. SPs, on the other hand,
will only concern themselves with the management of the virtual networks and the services
deployed on these VNs. Moreover, the separation of accountability will provide complete,
end-to-end control over the VNs to the SPs, obviating the requirement of coordination across
administrative boundaries as seen in the case of services that are deployed across multiple
administrative domains.
Note that these role do not map one-to-one to the entities. VNE offers flexibility in who
can take on these roles, and a single entity can take on multiple roles simultaneously. For
example, a SP who leases virtual resources from the InPs can further divide his resources
and offer them to other SPs. The recursive spawning of virtual resources, can thus, result in
a hierarchy of roles.
The other roles encountered in a VNE are end users and brokers. These roles closely
resemble their counterparts in any service environment deployed over the current Internet.
End User: End users are customers to service providers, whom they connect to through a
local physical infrastructure provider’s network. In this environment, an end user can choose
from a number of service providers, and possibly subscribe to multiple services at the same
time by simply connecting to multiple VNs [27].
Broker: Brokers act as mediators between InPs and SPs, to reconcile their different
objectives. They can work (a) on the customers’ behalf to gather information or act as
customers to the infrastructure providers, (b) on the providers’ behalf to perform resource
scheduling, i.e., consolidate resources from multiple providers, manage these resources, and
offer them to customers, or (c) as a neutral third party to manage negotiations between
SPs and InPs, and to mediate contracts between them. As in any service environment, we
encounter two different implementations of brokers in a VNE: (i) Centralized: where a single
broker performs the task of mediation, or (ii) Distributed: where multiple brokers [39,41]
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work in conjunction under a single resource management fabric.
Business Relations
Many business relations exist in a VNE between the actors. In this thesis, we are only
interested in that part of the business model where the service in question is virtual network
hosting, and the customers and the providers are SPs and InPs, respectively. End users have
no impact or relevance, and a customer-centric broker appears as single customer in this
context. Therefore, we explore them no further in the remainder of the thesis.
In this section we only focus on SP-to-InP and InP-to-InP relations. SP-to-SP relations
are commonly established to provide end-to-end services to end users, and come at a stage
following the virtual network service contracting. Therefore, we do not focus on them. Note
that an in depth discussion of the business model is provided in [25].
Vertical Relations: A vertical relation, or customer-provider relation, is established
between a SP and an InP at the time of VN setup. The InP generates revenue through
provisioning, operation and maintenance of virtual resources2 belonging to the SP. Like most
other customer-provider relations, these are also regulated by Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
[9,8,42] between the parties, that specify, among other details, performance constraints on
virtual resources, and how violations of the agreement can be resolved.
In the traditional inter-networking model, a service provider is usually tied to one network
provider. The provider ensures end-to-end service delivery by establishing peering relations
with other providers. A single InP can serve multiple customers (SPs), resulting in a many-to-
one customer-provider relations. However, VNE allows the flexibility of a single SP forming
relations with multiple InPs simultaneously by partitioning his VN and allocating them to
different InPs, resulting in a one-to-many customer-providers relation.
Horizontal Relations: Traditionally termed peering relations, a horizontal relation is
formed between two or more providers to facilitate end-to-end service delivery. In the
context of VNE, it is hard to imagine that all VN requests can be satisfied using the resources
of a single InP. Most often a VN has to be split among multiple InPs. Therefore, a horizontal
relation is formed between two or more InPs where each host a portion of the SP’s virtual
network.
2Throughout the rest of the thesis, we use the term virtual resources to refer to both virtual nodes and virtual
links
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In this context, these relations can be of two types: public relations and private relations.
Public relations are formed under the direction of a market mechanism, where competing
InPs find themselves co-hosting neighboring segments of a VN. As these relations are often
formed reluctantly, they hardly ensure low prices on inter-InP connectivity and guarantees
on overall network performance.
Private relations, on the contrary, are formed voluntarily among a group of InPs who
decide to cooperate in private in order to better compete in the market. These groups are
represented in the market by a provider-centric broker working under a management fabric
that spans all the members’ domains. Note, that private relations are beyond the boundaries
of the market mechanism, and to the market a group of InPs in such a relation (or the broker)
appears as a single provider.
2.2 Service Negotiation and Contracting in Virtual Network Environment
A customer-provider(s) (vertical) business relation is successful only when service is rendered
at the level of quality desired by the customer and at a price that satisfies the objectives of
both the providers and the customer. Effective service negotiation (negotiations for setting
price and quality of service) and contracting (the selection of providers) are extremely
important to reach such an equilibrium. These are of central importance in a VNE, where
great business flexibility exists in terms of which providers (InPs) a SP will contract with.
Although it may be possible for a small size virtual network to be fully embedded in a
single InP’s infrastructure, it is much less likely for VNs with high bandwidth and CPU
constraints and/or a wide geographic spread. Indeed, inter-continental VNs (e.g, VPNs,
overlays) are often provisioned among multiple network providers today. Under the current
network model, a service provider has access to few local infrastructure providers who
collaborate with other InPs, and negotiate privately among themselves, to jointly host such a
VN. However, such a business arrangement is not customer-driven, as the VN assignment
(among InPs) does not involve the customer in the negotiation process. Furthermore, it does
not exhibit fair market properties, as it lacks free market competition. With VNE, we can
expect a large number of InPs in the market, ranging from traditional underlay network
providers to new virtual network providers.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the aspects of service negotiation and contracting
in a multi-provider scenario remain untouched in this context. Service negotiation in VNE
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literature is restricted to the virtual network embedding or mapping problem, that deals with
provisioning or mapping virtual resources of a virtual network onto an underlying substrate
network. The aim is to allow a maximum number of VNs while reducing total embedding
cost (the total amount of resources consumed) and increasing revenue for providers.
The virtual network embedding problem is divided into two phases: (i) virtual node
mapping, followed by (ii) virtual link mapping. Many proposals exist in networking literature
to solve this NP-Hard problem [14]. Some make simplifying assumptions about the nature of
VNs or physical infrastructures; these assumptions include:
(i) all virtual network requests are known in advance [63],
(ii) infinite capacity of the underlay resources [63,46], and
(iii) VNs can only be of some specific topologies [46]
No such simplifying assumptions are made in [60,26]. However, [60] assumes support in
the underlay for virtual node and link migration, as well as multi-path routing. The authors
in [26] consider location requirements on nodes, in addition to previously considered
requirements on virtual resources, and introduce coordination between the node mapping
and the link mapping phases.
The VN embedding proposals assign VN requests to one substrate domain, i.e, consider
one InP’s infrastructure. Moreover, the existing proposals address the mapping from the
InP’s point of view, and do not consider the monetary cost (price). But, without the direct
participation in the service negotiation process, it is extremely difficult for a SP to ensure fair
market practices or minimum costs.
2.3 Service Negotiation and Contracting in Related Areas
The concept of multiple virtual networks cohabiting a shared physical substrate has appeared
in different capacities both in network literature and the industry. Like VNE, many service
environments exist that leverage virtualization techniques to offer resources as a service
to customers. These services can be divided into five categories: (i) network experiment
testbeds, (ii) virtual private networks (VPN), (iii) peer-to-peer services, (iv) grids, and




PlanetLab [12,51,55] is an overlay testbed designed to allow researchers and other users
to design, deploy and experiment with network applications and services that benefit from
distribution across a wide geographic area. PlanetLab concurrently hosts multiple network
applications and services by allocating a slice of its network-wide hardware resources to each
of them. Each slice, which resembles a virtual network, is composed of a set of lightweight
virtual nodes or Virtual Servers (VServer) spawned from physical nodes and connected
through the Internet.
PlanetLab’s business model resembles the VNE one, where the infrastructure provider’s
role is taken by PlanetLab, as they offer slices as a service to network researchers.
Technically, a slice somewhat differs from a virtual network. Rather than having dedi-
cated virtual links between VServers, PlanetLab uses the Internet’s best effort data delivery.
Moreover, as an application layer testbed, PlanetLab can afford little or no control over the
lower layers of the network protocol stack to the users. Therefore, services and network
experiments are often bound by constraints imposed by the underlying architecture.
The VINI Project [6,19,20] extends PlanetLab to reduce the gap between virtual networks
and slices with the addition of dedicated virtual point-to-point connectivity, access for each
virtual server to network interfaces and improved isolation between slices. In addition to
this, the Trellis platform [20], allows each virtual network to define its own topology, control
protocols and forwarding tables.
However, few effective network experiments with new protocols, especially routing
protocols, can be done on PlanetLab, as the transport mechanism remains TCP over IP.
The OpenFlow project [49] addresses this issue. It allows users to try out different routing
mechanisms by allowing direct access to switch/router flow tables. It uses customized
switches3 that consist of three parts: (i) A flow table with an action associated with each
flow entry to tell the switch how to process the flow, (ii) A secure channel connecting the
switch to a remote control-process (called the controller), allowing packets and commands
to be sent between the controller and the switch, and (iii) the OpenFlow protocol, which
provides a way for a controller to communicate with the switch. Network researchers are
allocated OpenFlow controllers or slices of them to conduct their experiments. Using the
OpenFlow protocol, they can configure switch/router flow tables and determine the routes
3OpenFlow switches are already in operation in the Stanford University campus
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their packets follow and the processing they receive. In this way, researchers have the
flexibility to experiment with routing protocols, security models, addressing schemes.
Although these network testbeds resemble the virtual network environment in outlook,
there are fundamental differences in the two business models. For example, in PlanetLab,
the physical hosts/nodes on which the overlay testbed is deployed are mostly contributions
by different research organizations. Contributing organizations relinquish complete control
over to PlanetLab. Moreover, PlanetLab slices are offered to network researchers at no cost.
Therefore, no competition exist between actors, obviating the need for price negotiation.
Slice management in PlanetLab is accomplished by a centralized authority called the
PlanetLab Central or PLC. The PLC prefers best-effort open access over admission control;
therefore, there is no room or need for negotiations for quality of service.
The PlanetLab architecture permits third-party brokers with the endorsement of the
PLC. However, these brokers are only responsible for managing slices at the granularity of
individual nodes, and therefore, have little significance in business activities.
2.3.2 Virtual Private Networks
A virtual private network [31] connects multiple geographically distributed sites using a non-
private data network to carry traffic between them. A VPN establishes connectivity between
its remote sites using various tunneling mechanisms [52] over the Internet. Each VPN site
contains one or more Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). These CPEs are connected using
direct tunnels between them, or through other VPN capable routers, known as provider
equipment (PE), in the core non-private network.
Typically a VPN is provisioned and managed by a VPN service provider (SP) on the
customers’ behalf [16]. The SP negotiates with the infrastructure providers (owners of the
PEs) to deploy a VPN. Deploying a VPN involves the selection of a set of providers, who
will provide their PEs, and a layout for VPN tunnels, such that one or more factors are
optimized. These factors are (i) total monetary cost for the customer, (ii) bandwidth of
tunnels, (iii) survivability of tunnels and edges, and (iv) number of hops between source
and destination CPEs.
The authors in [38] provide optimal and approximate algorithms for provisioning a VPN
such that bandwidth on the tunnels can be optimized. That is, the objective is to minimize
cost of connectivity for the customer by reserving as little bandwidth as necessary to support
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the expected communication, as well as to be flexible enough to support a wide range of
communication (traffic matrix) among the CPEs.
The authors in [29], on the other hand, provides heuristic based approaches that mini-
mizes total monetary cost of operation and maintenance of the VPN. The proposed algorithms
consider the cost of setting up and maintaining the tunnels, as well as of using the PEs as
tunnel endpoints. The algorithms first construct a CPE-based solution, where the CPEs are
connected through direct tunnels, then tries to improve the solution by spending funds F on
activating provider edges.
2.3.3 Peer-to-Peer Services
Peer-toPeer (P2P) networks [47] are overlay networks, composed of nodes or peers that allow
each other direct access to their resources (e.g, processing power, disk storage or network
bandwidth). The peers form self-organizing networks that are overlayed on the Internet
Protocol (IP). P2P networks became popular through its extensive use as a medium for file
sharing. Now they have reached far beyond, as they have become popular for deploying
a variety of services, including distributed storage, multimedia streaming and distributed
online games.
The business model for P2P services differs from other service environments in two ways:
(i) The customer and the service provider roles are symmetric; here, a customer is a peer
of the provider and may be a provider itself.
(ii) Any host can join in the network and become a peer as long as it is on the Internet;
and, it can also leave the network at will. Therefore, service provider to infrastructure
provider(s) (whose physical network is used to establish the overlay) relations are very
dynamic in nature, and most often SPs and InPs are oblivious of each other.
PeerMart [40, 39] proposes a distributed market mechanism for trading P2P services.
PeerMart holds a two-sided auction, where service providers specify the minimum cost of
their services, while customers specify the maximum price they are willing to pay for it. In
PeerMart, A group of decentralized brokers work in combination to reconcile the providers’
ask prices and the customers’ bid prices, by running a matching strategy.
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2.3.4 Grids
Grids [35] gained popularity in the past decade for solving large-scale problems and for
hosting large-scale applications and services. They enable the creation of virtual organiza-
tions, a group of geographically distributed individuals and/or organizations that share their
heterogenous resources, including computing resources, storage resources, softwares, and
databases. The sharing of resources in such a distributed multi-organizational environment
is enabled by running software systems, such as Globus [33], and interoperability is achieved
by having a common protocol architecture [35,34], that defines the basic mechanisms by
which sharing relations are negotiated, established and managed.
In [23,24], a business model is proposed for the Grid environment with two key players:
Grid Service Providers (GSPs) and Grid Resource Brokers (GRBs) representing customers.
GSPs make their resources available to customers and GRBs manage and schedule these
resources on the customers’ behalf. The interaction between GRBs and GSPs during the
price negotiation process is mediated by a Grid Market Directory (GMD). The authors
of [23,24] propose the use of real-world economic models for service negotiation in the grid
environment. These include,
• Commodity market model (also known as supply-and-demand driven pricing model),
where the resource owners set prices for their resources such that supply and demand
equilibrium is maintained. These prices are published through the GMD service, and
a GRB tries to identify resources that meet the customers’ requirements at minimum
cost.
• Posted price model, which is similar to the commodity market model, except, here the
providers advertise special offers to attract more customers.
• Bargaining model, where a GRB can bargain with a GSP for lower access price to its
resources. The negotiation continues until a price is agreed upon which satisfies the
objectives of both.
• Tender/contract-net model; Here the GRB announces its requirements and invites bids
from GSPs. Interested GSPs respond with their bids, and the contract is awarded to the
most appropriate (decided by the GRB) one.
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• Auction models, in which a GSP acts as an auctioneer and invites bids from consumers
or from GRBs. Access is provided to the consumer who offers the highest price.
To ensure proper operation of the market, the authors also propose an infrastructure to
support interaction protocols, allocation mechanisms, currency implementation, secure
banking and enforcement services.
Note that the business model for a grid computing environment resembles the VNE’s,
as both separate the roles of infrastructure providers and service providers. However, only
private InP-to-InP business relations can be formed in a grid where participating organizations
agree to share resources. But in VNE, InP-to-InP relations can be formed under the direction
of the market, when InPs (not in an existing peering relation) host different segments of the
same VN. The nature of these relations are not known in advance to the customer, making
service negotiation and contracting more challenging here than in the grid environment.
2.3.5 Cloud Computing Services
Cloud computing has recently become one of the most addressed topics in both academic
research and industry. The authors of [17] describe cloud computing as the combination
of the applications delivered as services and the infrastructure (datacenter hardware and
management softwares) that enable those services. Here, the infrastructure providers deploy
traditional utility services or web applications (e.g, Google AppEngine) on their infrastructure
(cloud), or virtualize their physical resources (e.g, Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure) and offer
them to customers. Additionally, the InPs offer automatic and easy scalability and pay-per-
use option with no long term commitment. The customers or the service providers can,
therefore, utilize the virtual resources or the web applications on-demand to deploy their
own applications and services without having to worry about scale or huge investments in
infrastructure.
The cloud computing business model is analogous to the VNE’s, except for the difference
in the type of service on offer. But, service negotiation and contracting in a multi-provider
cloud computing services market is still unexplored. We believe the reasons behind this are:
1. The concept is fairly new, and the number of companies in the market offering hosted
cloud computing services is still limited. Therefore, the need for a multi-provider
market is yet to be felt.
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2. Critical IT infrastructures are yet to migrate to cloud environments. So, many economic
and management issues are not pushed to the forefront yet.
Here, we discuss the pricing models of two cloud computing services, Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [1] and Windows Azure [7], that offer compute resources in
the cloud to its customers.
Amazon EC2 uses virtualization techniques [18] to divide its physical hosts or datacenters
into multiple virtual instances, and offers them to the service providers. The customers have
complete control, from the kernel upwards, over these virtual instances. Currently, Amazon
offers eight types of instances differing from each other in memory, cpu capacity and/or
storage capacity. Note that amazon provides no guarantee on I/O performance of these
instances.
Amazon primarily adopts two different pricing models:
1. Per-resource, usage-based pricing. Customers have no room for price negotiation as the
pricing is fixed for guaranteed instances. Promotional per usage prices are offered with
long term commitments.
2. Dynamic auction-based pricing for unused instances. A customer can bid with the
maximum amount he is willing to pay for an unused instance. If the bid exceeds the
current spot price (maximum current bid), the instance is granted to the customer
until the spot price exceeds it’s bid.
Microsoft Azure provides a platform for development, service hosting and service man-
agement through which users can develop applications and deploy them using on-demand
compute and storage capacities from Microsoft’s datacenters. Microsoft uses two pricing
models for this service:
1. a fixed (non-negotiable), usage-based pricing model, and
2. a flat discounted rate with long term commitments. In this category, the usage is limited




A Framework for Service Negotiation and Con-
tracting
In this chapter, we describe V-Mart, our proposed framework for service negotiation and
contracting in virtual network environment. We commence with a sample business case, in
section 3.1, used to illustrate the problem that is addressed in this thesis. In section 3.2,
we present the important features of V-Mart and describe its workflow. In section 3.3, we
provide a detailed description of V-Mart’s auction model, the model for service negotiation.
Finally, in section 3.4, we describe V-Mart’s VN partitioning algorithms that can be used by a
SP to determine how to best divide his VN among the bidders.
3.1 A Sample Business Case
Waterloo based company W-VPN is in the business of setting up VPNs for its customers
on demand. Most of W-VPN’s customers are multi-national companies who use VPNs to
connect their offices that are distributed all over the globe. W-VPN establishes connectivity
between the customers’ offices using VPN tunneling mechanisms over the Internet. It has
contracts with multiple network providers who offer their VPN-capable routers and switches
as intermediate points for these tunnels.
W-VPN would benefit immensely from having its own virtual network infrastructure,
consisting of virtual routers and virtual links. A VN would give it direct control over the
intermediate PEs (Provider Equipment), and it can set up or modify VPN tunnels quickly
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and on-demand. Moreover, having its own dedicated infrastructure would allow W-VPN to
deploy any tunneling mechanism in existence or even experiment with new and alternative
mechanisms.
3.1.1 Requirements on Virtual Networks
W-VPN’s virtual network has a topology and a set of performance constraints (e.g, [9,13,11]).
Generally, the kind of services deployed over the virtual network, quality of service and
geographic location distribution of the end user base determine the topology of a VN and
performance constraints on it.
Constraints on a virtual network can be specified at different granularities, starting from
each virtual resource to the entire VN. Typical constraints on a virtual node includes CPU
capacity, Queue size, availability, mean time to repair (MTTR), etc. For virtual links, these
include bandwidth, delay, latency, packet loss and availability. Also, end-to-end performance
constraints are often imposed on the entire VN topology or on parts (subgraphs) of it.
Threshold values for end-to-end latency, end-to-end delay, average jitter, maximum jitter and
network availability are few such constraints. Figure 3.1.2 shows the topology of W-VPNs
virtual network, the bandwidth requirements1 are denoted beside each link and the CPU
capacity constraints on the virtual nodes are shown in rectangles.
3.1.2 Co-Location Constraints
Different parts of a VN can be assigned to competing InPs. End-to-end performance guar-
antees on a subgraph (of the virtual network) that spans multiple such competing provider
domains are hard to achieve, as a clear assignment of responsibility and accountability is not
easy to establish. However, a SP may have strict performance constraints on a group of re-
sources or a subgraph of its VN. For example, W-VPN requires that the maximum end-to-end
delay be 2s in the subgraph used for the VPN of Company G, its most important customer. A
guarantee on this constraint is imperative to ensure that G is completely satisfied.
In situations like this, a SP can specify that these virtual resources be assigned to a
single InP so that failures can be promptly handled, and the responsible party can be clearly
identified and accordingly penalized. We term this requirement as Co-Location Constraint.






















Figure 3.1: The W-VPN virtual network
The parts of the W-VPN’s VN graph which have a co-location constraint, i.e, that have to be
assigned to a single InP, are shown using white ovals in figure 3.1.2.
3.1.3 Service Negotiation and Contracting for W-VPN’s VN
Although it may be possible for a small size virtual network to be fully embedded in a single
InP’s infrastructure, it is much less likely for large inter-continental VNs like W-VPN’s. Also,
an InP might only be willing to host parts of the VN simply because the rest does not appear
profitable. Moreover, in case a single InP can be found who can and is willing to host the
entire VN, it might still be cost minimizing for W-VPN to go with multiple InPs.
Given a market with multiple InPs competing to host its VN, the problem faced by W-VPN
boils down to establishing contracts with a set of InP(s), who can host the VN while satisfying
all the requirements at the least cost.
3.2 Overview of V-Mart
We now introduce V-Mart, an open market model and an enabling framework for automated
service negotiation and contracting in VNE. To the InPs, V-Mart fosters an open and fair
competition environment through auctioning; and to the SPs, it offers a customer-driven
virtual network partitioning and contracting engine.
Although, V-Mart is designed for the VNE context, it is flexible enough to be applied
to other distributed multi-provider service environment such as Cloud computing, Service-
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Oriented Architecture (SOA) based services and vendor selection for Business Process
Outsourcing.
3.2.1 Features of V-Mart
V-Mart is designed to have the following features:
• Open Market: Any willing InP may participate in V-Mart’s two-stage auctioning
process, through which the SP ultimately decides who to contract with and at what
price.
• Flexibility: An InP can deploy any pricing mechanism in the second round auction and
need not disclose it to the SP. In the first round, the InP can adjust his bidding strategy
according to his pricing model to get an upper hand in the second. Furthermore,
V-Mart’s partitioning algorithms do not impose a particular pricing model on the InPs,
but on the contrary, supports diverse InP pricing policies ranging from resource-wise
pricing to full network package pricing.
• Truthfulness: The first stage of the auction uses the Vickrey Truth Serum to elicit truth-
ful estimates on virtual resources hosting costs in order to avoid price manipulations
from the InPs. The second stage of the auction uses the results of the first and finally
resolves the auction to decide the winners.
• Incentive Compatibility: All parties in the market have enough incentive to gain
profit. The auction model ensures that InPs can bid with a certain profit margin,
and the VN Partitioning algorithms ensure that total cost of VN hosting for the SP is
minimized.
• Automated: The negotiation and contracting process is automated in V-Mart, sup-
porting quick on-demand VN setup. To this end, V-Mart offers the service providers
multiple VN partitioning algorithms that can be used to automatically determine a con-
tracting strategy that is cost minimizing. The algorithms not only consider virtual node
hosting and intra-InP virtual link hosting price estimates but also the SP’s preference
for resource co-location and the high cost of inter-InP communication.
• Effective and Efficient: V-Mart’s auction is designed to efficiently perform service
negotiation. Also, V-Mart provides effective VN Partitioning algorithms for various
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Figure 3.2: The V-Mart Workflow
market conditions, depending on the size of the VN topology, pricing models of the
providers, and preferences of the providers and the customers.
3.2.2 V-Mart Workflow
We briefly overview the V-Mart operations here, the technical details are presented in sections
3.3 and 3.4. Figure 3.2 illustrates a V-Mart workflow example.
Phase 1 - Request for Quotation (RFQ): The SP formulates his VN request in the
form an RFQ. The RFQ includes the virtual network topology, co-location constraints, and
performance constraints. Figure 3.3 shows a sample xml-like RFQ for W-VPN’s VN.
The RFQ is sent out to all interested InPs. This phase is shown as step 1 in Figure 3.2.
RFQs can be disseminated by posting them on well known RFQ repositories. InP’s can
periodically check these repositories to find VNs that suit their niche. We refer to each
21
interested InP as a VN bidder. Note that from the market’s perspective, there is no distinction
between a single InP and a representative of a group of collaborating InPs in a private
relation. Therefore, in this context we refer to either as a VN bidder.
Phase 2 - Resource Estimates: Each VN Bidder is expected to indicate the virtual
resources he is willing to host and the corresponding estimated price quotation under the
Vickrey Model (section 3.3). This is shown as step 2 in Figure 3.2.
The VN Bidder performs embedding (mapping virtual resources to physical ones) of the
VN to determine the actual hosting cost. However, the quotation is derived using a pricing
mechanism (e.g, [45]). V-Mart allows the use of any pricing model, but it is quite important
for a VN Bidder to adopt the proper bidding strategy (section 3.3.3).
Phase 3 - VN Partitioning: By the end of Phase 2, the SP obtains a set of price estimates
for each virtual resource in his virtual network. Based on these estimates the SP partitions
the VN into multiple segments and attach them to specific VN Bidders. V-Mart provides two
partitioning algorithms that perform this task automatically for various market conditions,
aimed at both minimizing total cost for VN hosting and satisfying the SP’s co-location
constraints. This is shown as step 3 in Figure 3.2.
Phase 4 - Final Offer: The list of segments obtained in Phase 3 is sent to all VN Bidders,
as well as the winning VN Bidder of each segment and the winning Vickrey price. The
VN Bidders make one final sealed bid that is upper bounded by the winning quote. This
second and final stage of the auction determines a final winner for each segment. This phase
corresponds to steps 4a and 4b in Figure 3.2.
Phase 5 - Contracting: The SP contacts the winning VN Bidder of each segment and
performs the final contracting and SLA generation. This phase is steps 5a and 5b in Figure
3.2.
3.3 The V-Mart Auction Model
Infrastructure providers would naturally desire to get the highest price from the service
provider for hosting his virtual network. A service provider, on the other hand, does not
want to pay the highest price but wants to negotiate for the best price based on the demand,
the utility he will derive from it, priority and available budget.
There are many approaches to set prices for networked resources in a multi-provider





























<Constraints ID=R0, Type="Node", Target=N0>
<Constraint ID=R00, Type="CPU Capacity">1.8GHz</Constraint>
.....
</Constraints>









Figure 3.3: Sample RFQ for W-VPN’s VN
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While this removes most communication and processing overhead, it implies that the central
authority have all information about the infrastructure providers’ networks, pricing models
and business policies, so it can determine the appropriate price. Moreover, it has to be
trusted equally by all. Unfortunately, these assumptions are hardly practical, because
InPs are reluctant to put complete faith on any party and share their sensitive internal
information. Another option might be for service providers to only have access to a set of
reputed infrastructure providers who aggregate resources from others to offer the VN as a
package to the SP. However, this process does not foster free market competition and creates
a strong barrier to entry for new and small InPs. Furthermore, it is impossible to guard
against monopoly or collusion on part of these InPs.
Auction is an effective open negotiation mechanism for multiple competing buyers
and sellers. It does not rely on price fixing by centralized authority and serves as a fairer
alternative to provider-centric whole VN packaging. The first step is to employ an appropriate
auction model for this context. The number and types of items being traded, the number
of sellers and buyers, the preferences of the parties, and the form of private information
participants have about preferences determine the best auction model for a particular
environment.
A virtual network (the item being traded) is a set of virtual routers correlated with
each other through virtual links. A VN bidder can bid on a per virtual resource basis.
But, a common approach is to offer price discounts for hosting a certain volume or a
combination/package of virtual resources. These discounted rates are calculated using a
discount function.
Once the bids are received by the auctioneer, the problem of winner determination (who
gets to host which virtual resources) involves finding a partitioning of the VN topology and
an allocation of each partition or segment to bidders such that total cost is minimized. But:
(i) The discount functions are rarely shared with the auctioneer or customer, and
(ii) In case these discount functions are disclosed, considering diverse discount functions
and pricing models makes winner determination extremely complex.
Our approach is to simplify the winner determination problem by splitting the auction
into two stages. In the first stage, each bidder specifies an estimate of the actual price for
hosting each virtual resource. These estimates are used to guide the VN partitioning process.
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VN bidders compete to influence the partitioning so that one or more resulting segments
suit their niche. The goal of the SP is to elicit truthful information on the cost of hosting
the virtual resources in order to perform an effective partitioning. In the second stage, each
partition or segment is auctioned individually and is assigned to the lowest VN bidder. The
second stage auction is based on actual prices. Bidders can calculate their bids by applying
any pricing model, including package pricing mechanisms without having to worry about a
mismatch between the package and the segment configurations.
3.3.1 A Two-Stage Vickrey Auction Model
There exist many forms of auctions, such as the popular English auction with reservation,
the Dutch auction, sealed high bid auction, Vickrey auction, etc. In general, a fair auction is
two-sided, where customers submit bids and producers submit quotations, and a matching
algorithm is run to produce the final result. When the customer or the producer cannot
form an informed evaluation of the goods, one-sided auction is preferred. This is the case in
VNE. Each infrastructure provider places different values on his virtual resources depending
on multiple factors including the complexity involved in embedding and provisioning the
virtual resources on a physical network, the amount of physical resources consumed, the
amount of residual capacity, load on the physical network, lifetime of the virtual network,
and his business goals and policies. The valuation is private and not disclosed to other
infrastructure providers or the service providers. A SP can only formulate a vague upper
bound on the cost. It is, therefore, very important to have an auction model that is free from
price manipulations, i.e, that ensures the InPs will offer prices proportional to his valuation
of the virtual resources. The Vickrey auction model [58] is such a truthful mechanism. Under
the Vickrey auction model, VN Bidders will quote a price for hosting a virtual resource, and
the bidder of the lowest quote would be given priority in the partitioning, but the SP will
accept prices equal to the second lowest quote. The Vickrey model is strategy-proof, meaning
that the only dominating strategy in this auction is for each VN Bidder to quote a price which
is not too high compared to the actual valuation of the VN. We employ this model in the first
stage of V-Mart’s auction.
The Vickrey auction model can be implemented as either an open or sealed auction. The
open auction has two issues.
1. It is price minimizing with respect to large number of bidders. The dominant strategy
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for a VN Bidder is to quote a price exactly equal to cost, and thus gaining zero profit.
This model is effective and strategy-proof, but does not offer fair market value to the
InPs.
2. The number of auction iterations is large. In an attempt to optimize profit, each
VN Bidder will decrease his bid ε-small from the current winning quote during each
iteration until he wins the bid or has a profit margin of zero. This is commonly known
as the shilling effect.
On the contrary, a sealed Vickrey auction is a single round auction that has all VN Bidders
bid a price in secrecy. This model does not suffer from the price minimization issue due to
the psychological effect of incomplete information.
Thus we arrive at the one-sided sealed Vickrey auction model for V-Mart. Each VN Bidder
receives a RFQ from the SP and submits a price quote for each resource he is willing to
host. The SP takes all the quotes for each virtual resource and modifies the bids to equal the
immediately higher bid. This is done to all bids, except the highest. For example, for the
quotes on a virtual node, {2, 3, 4} from bidders A, B and C respectively, the Vickrey quote is
{3, 4, 4}. The V-Mart model is strategy-proof, as we can see that a bidder has no incentive to
quote a price much higher than the actual cost, as it will only benefit his competitor.
The result of the first stage Vickrey auction serves as the basis for our VN partitioning algo-
rithms that minimize cost for the SP. As the result, we obtain a set of VN partitions/segments
with its associated total price and VN Bidder. In the second stage auction, all the segment
topologies, their total costs (termed maximum reservation price), and the identities of the
associated VN Bidders (termed owner of the insured bid) are sent to all VN Bidders in a single
round sealed auction. Each VN Bidder is asked to provide a final price quote on each segment
(if the VN Bidder is willing and/or able to do so), and this price quote is upper-bounded by
the maximum reservation price.
The SP takes all the bids and awards the contract for each VN segment to the lowest VN
Bidder for that segment. If the final price quote matches the maximum reservation price, the
owner of the insured bid receives the contract. This stage is a one-sided sealed auction with
maximum reservation. This auction model is selected for the same reasons as before.
Our two-stage auction model is flexible in dealing with heterogenous correlated com-
modities, which conventional auction models such as the Vickrey model are unable to. The
strategy-proof first stage auction provides the necessary faithful cost information upon which
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a SP can effectively perform a cost minimizing partitioning. The resulting contracts are then
processed between the SP and the winning VN Bidders. We note some issues:
1. In case one or more virtual nodes cannot be hosted by any bidder in the market, V-Mart
will fail to find a solution, i.e., fail to determine a contracting strategy for the SP.
However, in the presence of a large number of InPs in the market, we can expect this
to rarely occur.
2. For the SP to be faithful, the first round bids should be secured either by audit via a
trusted 3rd party, or by an open audit procedure at the end of the auction.
3. It is essential for the second-stage auction to have a maximum reservation price to
ensure the validity of the first stage Vickrey auction, and to prevent VN bidders from
quoting too low prices to influence the partitioning.
4. We do not study long term strategy emergence here, as typically a SP would not
provision the same VN repeatedly. Furthermore, obtaining the strategy of an InP
through observation over long term is not easy unless the physical resource topology
and the pricing model of the InP is known, both of which are private information to
the InPs.
3.3.2 The Pricing Models of a VN Bidder
Thus far, we have assumed that a VN Bidder is able to provide a per virtual resource
price estimate in the first stage auction. Although there is great flexibility and advantages
to per resource pricing model as implemented by a great majority of cloud computing
infrastructures (e.g. Amazon EC2, Google Apps, Microsoft Azure, etc.), the pricing models
of VNE are strongly influenced by the traditional network provider business model that
operates quite differently from the application provider’s or the cloud computing provider’s.
In this subsection, we show two common pricing strategies: volume discount and package
pricing. Both of these strategies are commonly used by sellers of multiple commodities.
Volume discount is a standard economic practice where the seller is willing to offer a
discounted per unit price when a large enough volume of the commodity is purchased (e.g.
wholesale). The discount is typically described as a discount function and reported to the
customer. In the VNE context, it is difficult to report this discount function to the SP. One
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reason is that the VN Bidder may not be willing to disclose his exact charging function
to the buyer in order to guard against a competitor who can masquerade as a buyer and
poach for his pricing model. Secondly, incorporating discount function in the VN partition
problem would increase the complexity of an already challenging problem. Instead, a VN
Bidder’s volume discount function can be applied in the second stage of the V-Mart auction
model, where the VN has already been segmented and the exact resource count in each
segment is public information. Hence in the first stage auction, the VN Bidder may quote
a resource-wise price at non-discounted rate, while in the second stage auction quote a
segment-wise price as modified by his discount function.
Package pricing is a common practice in heterogenous multi-commodity market, where a
seller wishes to sell a package of commodities together at lower price (e.g. a whole dinning
room set is cheaper than the sum of its individual parts). For the first stage of V-Mart auction,
the VN Bidder would calculate the price for a package of virtual resources and then map
this package price to per resource price. This can be done by either computing the average
price based on number of resources in the package, or by computing a weighted average
of the resources based on the proportional cost of supporting each resource in the package.
Although the latter method is preferred by V-Mart, it is understandable that a VN Bidder
may not wish to disclose the exact cost of hosting any specific resource within a package. In
the second stage of the auction, the VN Bidder will quote the segment price based on his
package price model. It is apparent that a mismatch in the VN Bidder’s original package
and the SP’s segment partition will be problematic. We discuss how such mismatch can be
avoided by adopting the right bidding strategy.
3.3.3 Bidding Strategy
We now discuss the aspect of strategy game play by VN Bidders under different pricing
models. To this end, the strategic move a VN Bidder makes in the first stage of V-Mart auction
is critical as it strongly influences how the VN segments are generated by the partitioning
algorithms. At first glance, this assertion appears to be contradictory to the concept of
strategy-proof as we have stated: the one-sided sealed Vickrey auction model has a single
dominate strategy which is to quote a price proportional to the cost. We now observe that
both the volume discount and the package pricing models can only provide a truthful cost
estimate in the first stage of the auction. Or to put it another way, the exact cost of hosting
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cannot be known until after VN partitioning.
In our discussion below, we use the term best strategy (not dominant strategy) for a bidder
to denote an approach or a strategy that is best under specific conditions, specified by the
bidder’s pricing model and its competitors’ pricing models and bidding strategies.
First we examine the possible strategy moves of a VN Bidder under volume discount
pricing. In the first round of auction, the VN Bidder can adopt a risk-averse stance or a
risk-seeking stance. A risk-averse VN Bidder will estimate the cost of the resources at their
non-discounted price and thus risk no chance of negative profit after VN partitioning. A
risk-seeking VN Bidder will estimate the cost of the resources already at a discounted price
by assuming some of the final VN segments will contain at least the expected number of
resources. Thus a negative cost could be incurred when this VN Bidder is the owner of an
insured bid with smaller than expected segment size. On the other hand, a risk-seeking
strategy is the best strategy move when the VN Bidder considers itself to be offering low
discounted price in the market. Effectively, it can corner the demand market especially when
the other VN Bidders are risk-averse or do not provide equivalent price discounts. However,
when all VN Bidders are risk-seeking, we arrive at an inefficient system state where the
sellers are selling at negative profit. Although such a state is cost minimizing for the SP, it is
not fair to the InPs.
The best strategy for a VN bidder who adopts a package pricing model is also a risk-
seeking approach: to bid for large packages and to compute per resource cost estimates
based on the discounted package rate rather than non-packaged resource-wise estimates. It
is also greatly important that the discounted package price be evenly distributed among the
virtual resources, i.e, island prices should be comparable to that of the intra-domain virtual
links. Effectively, this produces high inter-InP link weight compared with island weight. We
show in section 4.4 that this strategy will give the bidder the best chance to get one or more
segments/partitions in the second stage auction that match its desired packages.
3.4 VN Partitioning among Multiple Providers
The VN partitioning among multiple VN bidders is done after the first stage of the auction,
and on the basis of price estimates. The actual price of hosting the VN is only determined
after the second stage auction. However, the partitioning has great importance in achieving
a balance between the interests of the SP and the InPs. A partitioning that appears to be
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cost reducing for the SP, might turn out to be undesirable to the VN bidders. For example, a
partitioning that produces many small sized partitions can appear cost reducing based on
the estimates, but it does not guarantee best offers in the second stage auction from the
bidders who adopt volume based discounts.
Therefore, V-Mart’s VN partitioning algorithms consider:
1. Total VN hosting cost,
2. High price of inter-domain virtual link cost,
3. SP’s preference for virtual resource co-location, and
4. Bidders’ preferences on the size of the partitions based on their pricing models.
In this section we describe V-Mart’s VN partitioning algorithms. V-Mart proposes two
partitioning algorithms. For the first algorithm, we formulated the VN partitioning problem
mathematically as a mixed integer program. We then relaxed the integer constraints to
obtain a relaxed linear program. Finally, we applied a deterministic rounding technique to
obtain the assignment for each virtual node to a bidder. In the second type of algorithm,
we used a greedy local search method. The algorithm starts from an initial mapping and
greedily performs local improvements to find a local optima. We present two variants of this
greedy search algorithm: G-MinIslandCost and G-MinCutSize, depending on the starting
configurations that they use.
3.4.1 Virtual Network Model and Problem Description
We start with a formal description of the problem.
Virtual Network Request
We denote a virtual network request by an undirected weighted graph, GV = (NV , LV),
such that NV and LV are the set of virtual nodes and the set of virtual links, respec-
tively. The performance constraints on a virtual resource are represented using a set
of type/value pairs. For example, the constraints on link lV are represented as R(l v) =
{(”bandw idt h”, 200), (”Max Delay”, 200ms)}.
Co-location Constraint: Co-Location constraints on pairs of VN nodes are expressed
using a Binary Co-Location Matrix, Col, where col(a, b) = {0, 1}∀a, bεNV such that, if,
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col(a, b) = 1, then both a and b have to be assigned to the same bidder. Note, that the
co-location constraint is symmetric and transitive. Therefore, the co-location matrix divides
the VN into a set of islands, where each island is composed of VN nodes, that form a chain
of co-location constraints, and the virtual links that connect these nodes. For example, if
col(a, x1) = col(x1, x2) = ... = col(xn, b) = 1, then nodes a, x1, ..., xn and b, along with the
links that connect any two of these nodes, belong to the same island.
Estimates of Virtual Resource Hosting Price
Assume there are K VN bidders competing for the virtual network. Each bidder quotes
the estimated price for hosting VN, GV = (NV , LV). The estimates are specified on a per-
resource basis. Note that a VN bidder might not be able or willing to host an entire
VN. Therefore, he specifies which virtual resources he is willing to host along with the
price estimate. We represent the estimates on each virtual node nVεNV with a vector,
C N(nV) = {cN
k
(nV)|k = 1, ..., K}, where cN
k
(nV) is the estimated price for node nV quoted by




We consider two types of prices for each virtual link lV :
1. Intra-domain: A VN bidder specifies an intra-domain link hosting price for link lV if
he also quotes prices for both of its endpoints. We represent the intra-domain link price
estimates using a vector, C L(lV) = {cL
k
(lV)|k = 1, ..., K}, where cL
k
(lV) is the quoted
price for link lV by bidder k.
2. Inter-domain: If the end-nodes of link lV are assigned to two different bidders, say
k1 and k2, the intra-domain link price specified by either bear no sense. The actual
price depends on the horizontal relation between k1 and k2, and is not disclosed by
either to the SP. Therefore, a SP is left with no choice, but to assume an estimate on an
empirical basis. As, most often k1 and k2 are in competition, the prices of hosting such
inter-domain links are generally higher than intra-domain links of similar capacity. In
fact, industry trends suggest that inter-domain communication cost is a magnitude
higher than intra-domain. For example, Amazon EC2 [1] charges at most $0.01 for one
GB of intra-provider data transfers and a minimum $0.10 for inter-provider. Therefore,
for each virtual link, V-Mart assigns a constant inter-domain cost Ć L, valued at an order























Figure 3.4: V-Mart VN partitioning process (a)Virtual network topology of W-VPN, (b)Meta-
graph formed by coalescing nodes with colocation constraints into islands (c) Formation of
packages using V-Mart partitioning algorithm
VN Partitioning Problem
The problem of partitioning a VN among k VN bidders can be divided into two steps:
1. Coalesce virtual nodes with Co-Location constraints, forming a meta-graph of islands,
and
2. Partition the meta-graph into P <= K partitions.
The process is shown in figure 3.4.
Meta-Graph Formation: Each island in the VN graph has to be assigned to the same
partition. Therefore, as the first step of partitioning, V-Mart forms a meta-graph, GM =
(I M , LM), from the VN request graph, where I M is the set of islands in the VN and LM is the
set of virtual links between two virtual nodes in different islands. The price estimates for an
island iMεI M are equal to the total of all the virtual resources, virtual nodes and links that
compose the island, we represent the estimate as, C I(iM) = {c I
k













(a, b). Note that LM is a subset of LV , so we do not
modify the representation for the price estimate on these links, we only alter the end points
of the links from virtual nodes to the islands that those nodes belong to. The meta-graph
formation process is shown in figure 3.4(b).
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Meta-Graph Partitioning Problem: The meta-graph partitioning problem can be ex-
pressed as the mapping function,
MN : I M → {bidder |bidder = 1, 2, ..., K} (3.1)
from islands to VN bidders.













We represent the virtual links as a tuple of the end-points, e.g, lM is represented as (a, b),
such that islands a and b are the end points of lM .
The VN meta-graph partitioning problem is a complex optimization problem. Each
island and link in the meta-graph is associated with a K -dimensional cost vector. Also, the
placement of an island is strongly correlated with that of its neighbor islands. Moreover, the
partitioning has to consider the preferences of VN Bidders. In a market where most bidders
adopt volume based pricing models, larger partition sizes are preferable to the InPs. The SP
also benefits from having partitions that are appealing to the InP. This ensures that the SP
will get low price offers from the bidders in the second stage. But, having large partitions
carry lesser importance to bidders who adopt a resource wise pricing model.
3.4.2 Linear Programming Relaxation and Deterministic Rounding
As our first stab at this problem we formulate the VN partitioning problem as a mixed integer
program. We then relax the integer constraints and apply a deterministic rounding technique
to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm, LP-D, for finding a mapping function 3.1.
Mixed Integer Problem Formulation
The following mixed integer program represent the VN meta-graph partitioning problem.
Variables:
• xi, j : A binary variable which has the value of 1 if island i is assigned to bidder j
• yi, j : A binary variable that has the value of 1 if both end-nodes of meta-link i are























xi,k = 1,∀iεI M (3.4)
-Link Assignment Consistency Constraint
yl,k ≤ xn,k∀kε{1, 2, ..., K}, l = (n1, n2),∀nε{n1, n2} (3.5)
-Domain Constraints
xi,kε{0, 1},∀iεI M ,∀kε{1, 2, ..., K} (3.6)
yl,kε{0, 1},∀lεLM ,∀kε{1, 2, ..., K} (3.7)
Remarks:
• The objective function (3.3) of the Mixed Integer Program (MIP) tries to minimize the
total cost of hosting the VN. The first term in the objective function calculates the total
cost of hosting the virtual nodes, while the second and the third terms calculate the
cost of hosting the virtual links.
• The unique assignment constraint (3.4) ensures that each island is assigned to exactly
one VN bidder.
• The Link Assignment Consistency Constraint (3.5) ensures that a link is assigned to
the VN bidder that hosts both its endpoints.
Linear Program Relaxation and Deterministic Rounding Algorithm
Solving the mixed-integer program for VN partitioning is computationally intractable [54].
Hence, we relaxed the integer constraints (3.6) and (3.7) to obtain the following linear
program (LP_RELAX),
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Relaxed Linear Program, LP_RELAX
Variables:
• xi, j : A binary variable which has the value of 1 if island i is assigned to bidder j
• yi, j : A binary variable that has the value of 1 if both end-nodes of meta-link i are






















xi,k = 1,∀iεI M
-Link Assignment Consistency Constraint
yl,k ≤ xn,k∀kε{1, 2, ..., K}, l = (n1,n2),∀nε{n1,n2}
-Domain Constraints
0 ≤ xi,k ≤ 1,∀iεI M ,∀kε{1, 2, ..., K} (3.8)
0 ≤ yl,k ≤ 1,∀lεLM ,∀kε{1, 2, ..., K} (3.9)
Deterministic Rounding-Based VN Partitioning Algorithm (LP-D): Once we have the
fractional solution (shown in line 1 of algorithm 1) of the relaxed linear program, LP_RELAX,
we apply our deterministic rounding technique to obtain integer values (0 or 1) for the
variable x , i.e, determine the mapping for each island to a VN bidder.
For each island i, the maximum fractional value is rounded to 1, i.e, i is assigned to
bidder k, such that the value of xi,k is maximum. Ties are broken towards the bidder who
offers the lower price for hosting the island (line 7).
The solution for the relaxed linear program, LP_RELAX, can be reached in polynomial
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Algorithm 1: Linear Programming Relaxation and Deterministic Rounding
Procedure: LP-D(GM = (I M , LM))
solve LP_RELAX;1
foreach i εI M do2
max← 0.0;3
max_mapping← 04
foreach kε{1, 2, ..., K} do5
if (max = 0.0 || xi,k ≥ max) then6















time. Therefore, it is easy to see that LP-D runs in polynomial time.
3.4.3 Greedy Local Search
The VN partitioning algorithm is a complex optimization problem. Many simplifying assump-
tions could be made to make it tractable. At one end of the spectrum lies a partitioning
problem that only considers link costs and tries to minimize total cost by simply minimizing
the cut-size, the number of links that cross domain borders. Unfortunately, this way we only
reduce the problem to the NP-Hard k-cut problem [37]. At the other end of the spectrum, lies
a greedy assignment of islands to bidders who quotes the lowest price, without considering
link costs.
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We present two variants, G-MinIslandCost and G-MinCutSize, of the greedy local search
algorithm (outlined in algorithm 2) that start from the following two greedily formed
configurations or mapping functions that resemble the extreme cases discussed above. The
algorithm then performs local improvements to obtain a mapping function (or assignment of
the islands) that minimizes the total VN hosting cost.
1. MinIslandCost: Each island is assigned greedily to the bidder with lowest quoted
price, resulting in the initial mapping function,
MN(iM) = arg mink{c Ik(i
M)},∀iMεI M
2. MinCutSize: Each VN bidder bids for a part or a subgraph of the VN topology. The size
of such a desired subgraph (desired by the bidder) can range from a single island to the
entire VN. The MinCutSize forms its initial mapping by the following iterative method:
In each iteration, it finds the largest desired subgraph (with the highest number of
islands) that exclusively consists of islands that are yet to be assigned, and assigns each
island of the subgraph to the bidder of that subgraph. In case of ties (equal subgraph
sizes), the islands are assigned to the bidder who quotes the lowest total price (for
the islands and the links) for the subgraph. This process is continued until no desired
subgraph can be found that consists of only unassigned islands. The remaining islands
are then greedily assigned using the MinIslandCost approach.
Note that the two variants of the algorithm only differ in the starting configurations. The
algorithm starts by forming a starting configuration, in line 1. It then performs an iterative
local search for a mapping function that yields the least total estimated cost. During an
iteration, each island is considered separately to find the best alternative mapping (bidder)
for it. Candidate bidders are compared using the Gain metric2. For an island iM , the value
of gain corresponding to bidder B is proportional to the cost reduction that can be achieved
if the assignment of iM were to be changed to B (from its current assignment,MN(iM)). It
is calculated in line 6 using the formula, GainB(iM) =
β[
∑
aεA,MN (a)=MN (iM )
cL
MN (iM )
(iM , a) +
∑











(iM )− c IB(i
M )] (3.11)
2This heuristic is inspired by the proposals, [44] and [32], for solving the graph bipartitioning problem
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Algorithm 2: Greedy Local Search Based VN Partitioning
Form Initial Mappings;1
for iteration← 1 to m do2
terminate← 13
foreach iMεI M do4
foreach Bidder B, such thatMN(iM) 6= B do5
GainB(iM)← calculateGain(iM , B)6
end
Bmax ← arg maxB{GainB(iM)}7
if GainBmax (i









where, A = {a | a is a neighbor of iM}
The first part of the formula (equation 3.10) calculates the decrease in estimated link
(both intra and inter-domain) hosting cost, while the second (equation 3.11) calculates the
decrease in estimated island provisioning cost. 0 ≤ α,β ≤ 1 are tuning parameters, that can
be used to reflect other SP preferences than monetary cost minimization. We explore this in
the next section.
Each island is assigned to the bidder that offers the highest positive gain (line 9). If no
positive gain move is found for any island during an iteration, the algorithm is terminated
(lines 10-12).
The algorithm runs for at most m iterations. During each iteration, all islands are
considered for new mapping. For each island, the algorithm calculates gains for all bidders,
except that to which it is currently assigned. The gain calculation for a bidder considers all
the virtual links from an island. Therefore, the worst case time complexity of the algorithm
38
is O(m|I M |K |LM |)
3.4.4 Bidder Reputation in VN Partitioning
Not all infrastructure providers in a VNE are equally reputed. Reputation of a bidder is built
over time based on many factors including quality of service, price, scale of the physical
infrastructure, and commitment to customers. The VNE marketplace will consist of a mixture
of reputed and non-reputed new InPs, and offering low prices is often a technique adopted
by new and non-reputed enterprises to get entry into a market. Therefore, the SP has to
make a tradeoff between provider reputation and cost.
As an extension of our work, we explore the impact of bidder reputation on the VN
partitioning algorithms. Note that mechanisms used to measure and manage the reputation
of providers are beyond the scope of our work. We assume that the knowledge about a
bidder’s reputation is available in the form of a reputation factor Rk , ∀kε{1, 2, ..., K}.
Bidder Reputation in LP-D:
In order to consider the bidders’ reputation, we modified the objective function of LP_RELAX




















− Ć L) + |LM |Ć L (3.12)
By dividing the quoted prices for hosting both the islands and the links, we ensured that
the partitioning process will have a bias towards more reputed bidders. 0 < γ <= 1 is a
tuning parameter that can be used to control this bias, i.e, express the weight of an SP’s
preference for reputed bidders relative to that for minimum total cost.
Bidder Reputation in the Greedy Local Search Algorithm:
To introduce bidder reputation to the local search based algorithm, we modified tuning
parameters α and β for gain calculation in equations 3.10 and 3.11 as:
β = γ× Ĺ× (RB −RMN (iM )) + 1 (3.13)
α = γ× (RB −RMN (iM )) + 1 (3.14)
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aεA,MN (a)=MN (iM ) 1 = the
increase in the number of intra-domain links if the mapping for iM were to change to bidder
B, and 0 < γ <= 1 is a tuning parameter that can be used to express the importance of
reputation relative to cost. By multiplying the two factors of the gain (equations 3.10 and
3.11) with the difference in reputation between the current and candidate bidders, we ensure
that each local move in our heuristic based local search will have a tendency, proportional to




In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of V-Mart’s VN graph partitioning algorithms
through simulation experiments. Our focus is to exhibit that these algorithms can be applied
to a wide variety of virtual environments. We measure total cost, execution times, observed
difference with the base case solution and average partition sizes for the algorithms. We
vary the parameters of the VNE operational and market model to show that the algorithms
perform well under various market conditions. We also study the impact of incorporating
the bidders’ reputation into the algorithms.
4.1 Compared Algorithms
We explore six algorithms in our experiments. These are summarized in table 4.1.
An exhaustive search for the mapping function that yields the minimum total cost has a
complexity of O(N K ), where N is the total number of islands in the VN meta-graph and K is
the number of bidders in the market. Therefore, even for a very small VN topology (say, with
30 nodes) and a small number of bidders (say, 10) finding the optimal solution takes hours.
Therefore, we compare our algorithms, G-MinIslandCost, G-MinCutSize and LP-D with the
relaxed linear program, LP_RELAX. The fractional solution (the achieved optimal value for
the objective function 3.3) produced by relaxed linear program is guaranteed to be less than
or equal to the minimum total cost yielded by the mixed-integer program. We use the GNU
Linear Programming Kit [4] to solve LP_RELAX.
For large input graphs we compare our algorithms with an implementation of a simple
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Table 4.1: Summary of Compared VN Partitioning Algorithms
Algorthm Name Description
G-MinIslandCost Greedy Local Search Based VN Partitioning starting from
a greedy assignment of islands to bidders with the lowest bid
G-MinCutSize Greedy Local Search Based VN Partitioning starting
from a greedy assignment of subgraphs based on its size
LP-D Linear Program relaxation with deterministic rounding
LP_RELAX Relaxed Linear Program of the Mixed-Integer Program for VN
Partitioning
GA-Vanilla A simple genetic algorithm for VN partitioning
G-GA Greedy Local Search Based VN Partitioning starting from multiple
starting configurations, selected through the application
of genetic algorithm, GA-Vanilla
genetic algorithm [36] for VN Partitioning, called GA-Vanilla (appendix A). The successful use
of genetic algorithms (GA) as tools for solving many complex optimization problems [36,50],
specifically graph partitioning [22] and VLSI circuit partitioning [48], inspired our choice.
We also compare the algorithms with a third version of our greedy local search algorithm,
G-GA. Rather than starting from a single starting configuration, the G-GA algorithm uses
multiple starting points and takes the best solution after performing a local search from each.
The starting configurations are selected through an application of GA-Vanilla.
4.2 Metrics
We use the following five metrics to evaluate the performance or the algorithms.
1. Total Cost: The total cost for hosting the entire virtual network is calculated using
equation 3.2. This value is not the amount the SP has to pay, rather it is based on
price estimates quoted by the VN bidders in the first round auction. However, as the
actual cost for each segment of the VN, which is fixed after the second round auction,
is upper-bounded by the costs that are calculated during the VN partitioning, the SP
wants to minimize this value nonetheless.
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2. Observed Approximation Ratio: We define the observed approximation ratio for an
algorithm as the ratio between the total cost produced by it and that by LP_RELAX.
The fractional solution produced by LP_RELAX is guaranteed to be better than or equal
to the minimum total cost. Therefore, a high observed approximation ratio for an
algorithm indicates that it produces a total cost that has a high difference with the
minimum. The optimal value (one that is associated with the minimum total cost) of
the observed approximation ratio for an algorithm is 1.
3. Execution Time: We calculate total time (in milliseconds) each algorithm takes to
calculate the minimum cost assignment.
4. Average Partition Sizes: We measure the average sizes of the resulting partitions.
Our main objective is to minimize the total price that the SP has to pay. So, first and
foremost, the VN partitioning process has to minimize the total estimated price. But, it
also has to consider the bidders’ preferences. A partitioning that produces segments
that are not consistent with the volume or configuration desired by the bidders, does
not ensure good offers/bids in the second round auction. Larger average partition sizes
preferred by bidders who adopt volume based pricing; but it is not as important to one
who adopts resource-wise pricing.
5. Percentage Increase in Total Cost: We also measure the percentage increase in total
cost that results from incorporating the bidders’ reputation factors into an algorithm.
Note that the total costs for both versions (with or without reputation factors) of all
the algorithms are calculated in the same way (using equation 3.2), expect LP_RELAX,
which calculates the fractional solution using equation 3.12. We measure the percent-
age increase in total cost to exhibit the impact of incorporating bidders’ reputation
factors into the algorithms.
4.3 Experiment Settings
We evaluate the performance of the V-Mart algorithms using four sets of experiments to
cover a wide variety of market and operational models. The virtual network topologies,
used in all of these experiments, are random, flat and connected graphs generated with the
GT-ITM tool [62], where each pair of nodes in a graph are connected with a probability of
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0.05. We ran each experiment on five different random input graphs, and displayed the
average values taken after removing the highest and the lowest. We opt for random graphs
to represent virtual network topologies for two reasons. First, as the concept of virtual
network environment is fairly new, a concrete operational model, that specifies the nature of
the virtual network topologies, is yet to be established. And second, we believe that such a
fixed model is not likely to emerge, as VN topologies are expected to be more diverse than
the current underlays. Note that we consider the input graphs as the meta-graphs; therefore
each node in the graph represents an island.
The sets of experiments that we conducted are:
1. Varying the size of the virtual network topology: In this set of experiments, we
explore the impact of the size of a virtual network topology on each of the algorithms.
These experiments are divided into two parts. The first part deals with relatively
smaller input graphs, where the number of nodes vary from 5 to 150. The number
of bidders in the market is set to 20. The estimated prices of virtual resources are
uniformly distributed between 10 and 100. We compare the G-MinIslandCost, G-
MinCutSize, LP-D and LP_RELAX and show the results in figure 4.1. In the second
part of this experiment, we examine the performance trends over very large (up to
1000 nodes) virtual network topologies. The number of bidders for these cases is set
to one-fifth of the number of nodes in the graph. We show total costs and execution
times in figure 4.2. The average size of partitions grow in a trend similar to that of
figure 4.1(d) (which we do not show here).
2. Varying the Acceptance Percentage: We define the acceptance percentage of a virtual
island as the percentage of bidders who want to host it, i.e, a 70% acceptance percent-
age for an island denotes that 70% bidders quoted a price for it. This value depends on
a number of factors, including, performance constraints on the resource, its location,
load on the providers’ networks, or simply a bidder’s business preference. For the
previous set of experiments we fixed this value to 70% for all islands. In this set, we
vary the value from 10 to 80 percent. We use input graphs with 70 nodes and consider
20 bidders. The quotes on virtual resources by the bidders are, again, taken from a
uniform distribution with maximum and minimum values of 100 and 10, respectively.
The results are shown figure 4.3.
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3. Varying the ratio between the price estimates for virtual islands and for virtual
links: In the previous experiments we picked the virtual link and island price quotes
from the same distribution, representing a small class of pricing models (e.g, volume
based pricing). However, in a resource-wise pricing model, virtual links and islands
may not have similar prices. In this set of experiments, we vary the price ratio between
islands and the links, from 1:10 to 50:1, to explore the applicability of the algorithms
under different provider pricing models. We fix the size of the input graphs to 70
islands and the number of bidders to 20. The results are shown figure 4.4.
4. Bidders’ Reputation: Thus far we have assumed that the customers are only con-
cerned with the total cost and not the reputation when selecting the bidders. Therefore,
we set the values of the tuning parameters α and β to one. In the final set of experi-
ments we introduce the bidders reputation into the algorithms as described in section
3.4.4.
For this part, we do not assume any relation between a bidder’s reputation and his
pricing mechanism. Neither do we make any assumption on how an SP’s preference
for reputed bidders and that for low total costs are related. We only show how the
inclusion of reputation affects the performance of the algorithms. The results are
shown in figure 4.5. For these experiments, the number of islands in the input graph
vary from 5 to 150. The number of bidders is set to 20, and each bidder is assigned a
reputation factor between 1 and 10 at random. The acceptance probability of an island
is set to 70% probability. The quotes on virtual resources are uniformly distributed
between 10 and 100.
4.4 Observations
In this section we present our observations from the experiments.
(i) The proposed algorithms produce near optimal results. It can be seen from figure
4.1(a) that all three proposed algorithms minimize the total cost of hosting a virtual
network. For small input graphs (up to 60 nodes) the LP-D algorithm produces results
that are very close to the optimal, while the G-MinIslandCost yields the highest cost.
Also, the G-MinIslandCost produces partitions which are, on the average, much smaller
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compared to the remaining algorithms (figure 4.1(d)). Both results indicate a larger
cut-size in G-MinIslandCost’s solution compared to the other algorithms. But, as the
graph size increases a high number of inter-domain links becomes an inevitable part
of the final solution for all algorithms. Therefore, the differences between the total
costs and the average package sizes reduce. The G-MinCutSize outperforms the rest
because it looks up a solution in the vicinity of the largest average partition size and,
thus, the lowest cut-size. Overall, for a sizable input graph all three algorithms achieve
total costs that are close to the optimal (figure 4.1(b)), with the G-MinCutSize settling
within 1.2 times, LP-D within 1.3 and G-MinIslandCost within 1.5 times the fractional
solution.
(ii) The heuristic-based algorithms are highly scalable, but LP-D is not. The execution
time of LP-D grows rapidly with the size of the topology ( figure 4.1(c)), making it
unsuitable for very large virtual network topologies. In contrast, the heuristic based
algorithms are highly scalable; this is apparent from the steady rise in execution times
(figure 4.2(b)) and the total costs (figure 4.2(a)). We make three observations while
comparing the performance of the algorithms for large virtual networks.
(a) The G-GA outperforms both G-MinIslandCost and G-MinCutSize in terms of total
cost. But, the difference is negligible. Moreover, it takes much longer to complete
(figure 4.2(b)).
(b) G-MinCutSize performs better than G-MinIslandCost for all sizes of the VN topol-
ogy. But, the difference becomes quite small for very large VN topologies.
(c) All three local search algorithms yield total costs that are less than half of that by
GA-Vanilla.
Under the assumption of high inter-domain link costs, the optimal solution lies in the
locality of the minimum cut configuration. Therefore, the G-MinCutSize and G-GA,
which perform a local search starting from a cut minimizing mapping, perform the
best. In this context, a genetic algorithm is not a suitable local search tool; because,
even if a cut-minimizing configuration is part of a parent population, the crossover and
mutation operators are likely to produce a solution that is far away from it.
(iii) The algorithms converge for low acceptance percentage. A feasible assignment
contains no mapping from an island to a bidder that has not quoted a price for it. For
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Figure 4.1: Varying the size of the input graphs, (a) Total Cost, (b) Observed Approximation
Ratios, (c) Execution times, (d) Average Partition Sizes
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Figure 4.2: Scalability (a)Total Cost, (b) Execution Times
low acceptance percentages, few feasible assignments exist. So, all the algorithms
converge to similar final configurations. Therefore, the total costs and the resulting
average partition sizes produced by the algorithms are close to each other, as well as,
to the optimal solution (figures 4.3(a), 4.3(b), and 4.3(c)). As the percentage goes
higher, more and more bidders bid for hosting large portions of the virtual network.
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Figure 4.3: Varying the Probability that an InP will be willing to host a given Island (a) Total
cost, (b) Approximation Ratios, (c) Average Partition Sizes
G-MinCutSize and LP-D perform better with higher acceptance percentages as they
have a bias for larger partitions. The G-MinIslandCost soon parts company with the
others because of its bias towards lower priced islands.
(iv) Diverse pricing models are supported by the V-Mart’s partitioning algorithms. We
divide our observations into two parts:
• A resource-wise pricing model is best represented by a island price to link price
ratio of greater than or lesser than 1. The LP-D performs consistently over different
island price to link price ratios (figure 4.4(a)). As the ratio rises, the impact of the
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Figure 4.4: Varying The Ratio between Island Hosting cost and Link Hosting Cost (a) Total
Cost, (b) Approximation Ratios (c)Average Partition Sizes
cut-size on the total cost begin to diminish and the impact of island hosting prices
become more prominent. Therefore, the G-MinCutSize begins to deteriorate and
G-MinIslandCost starts to improve. Finally G-MinIslandCost outperforms its local
search based companion as the ratio reaches around 25:1. After this point the
reduction in island cost by a move can be large enough to offset an increase in
inter-domain link cost. This also results in the reduction in average package sizes
for all the algorithms (figure 4.4(c)).
• In general, volume-based pricing models, e.g, package pricing and volume dis-
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Figure 4.5: Preference for Reputed Bidders, (b) Total Cost (c) Approximation Ratio (a)
Percentage of Islands Assigned, (d) Percentage Increase in Total Cost
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counts, are better supported by G-MinCutSize and LP-D because of their bias
towards larger partitions (figures 4.1(d), 4.3(c) and 4.4(c)). A volume-based
pricing model is best represented by an island price to link price ratio of close to
1.Effectively, this introduces a high difference between the inter-domain link costs
and the island hosting costs. G-MinCutSize and LP-D both perform well for these
values (figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b)). For package-pricing models, G-MinCutSize
is the most suitable algorithm, as it assigns packages, starting with the largest,
to the lowest price bidders. G-MinCutSize considers moving only one island at a
time; therefore, a package is only broken if the reduction in price for moving an
island is large enough to offset the increase in cut-size. This is highly unlikely for
island price to link price ratios close to 1. Therefore, G-MinCutSize ensures the
preservation of packages for bidders who bid low prices for large packages.
(v) The local search algorithms display a bias towards more reputed bidders. In-
clusion of the bidders’ reputation factors in the tuning parameters α and β of the
heuristic-based algorithms forces most of the islands to be assigned to bidders with
high reputation (figure 4.5(a)). Here, G-MinCutSize’s bias towards larger partitions is
overridden by that for reputed bidders; because, the decrease in island hosting cost,
multiplied by the increase in bidders’ reputation, easily overcomes the increase in
inter-domain link cost. Therefore, the G-MinIslandCost and the G-MinCutSize converge
to similar mapping functions (figure 4.5(b)). The change in bias for G-MinCutSize con-
tributes to a high increase in total cost from the initial version (settles to around 35%,
as shown in figure 4.5(d)). However, the increase is lesser (settles to less than 20%)
for G-MinIslandCost, as both versions assign similar importance/weights to reducing
the number of inter-domain cuts. LP-D shows a more moderate bias, and, therefore, a
much smaller increase in total costs from the initial version (figure 4.5(d)). All three
algorithms settle to within 1.6 times the optimal solution (figure 4.5(c)). Note that
the optimal value of the objective function of this version of LP_RELAX is lesser than
the previous version’s. Because, each virtual resource price is divided by the bidder’s
reputation. This is the reason behind the initial spike in the observed approximation
ratios for all the algorithms. But, as the number of islands grows, the inter-domain link
costs become the most significant part of the total cost, which are not affected by the




Network virtualization environment (VNE) affords great business and technological flexibil-
ities to service providers and infrastructure providers. Under the current network model,
a service provider has access to a few local infrastructure providers who offer end-to-end
service delivery by peering with other InPs in private. Such a business arrangement is not
always fair, as (i) service providers have no involvement in fixing the price for the deployment
of their services, and (ii) the market is dominated by the big players and new infrastructure
providers find it difficult to gain entry in the market. But, VNE allows any InP to participate
in a fair competition and SPs to enjoy great flexibility in which InPs they can contract with.
With a view to enabling such flexibility, we presented V-Mart, a framework for automated
service negotiation and contracting in this environment. There are two major parts of V-Mart:
(i) an auction-based market where SPs and InPs can participate in open negotiations, and
(ii) a VN partitioning tool which allows the SP to resolve the competition, and contract with
the best set of InPs. We conclude our discussion in this chapter with a summary of V-Mart’s
contributions, and our plans for future.
5.1 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of the proposed framework are summarized below:
• V-Mart is an open market. The local infrastructure providers are not the only partici-
pants in V-Mart’s auction. Rather, any provider (InP) has the option to compete in the
V-Mart auction, and all bidders have the opportunity to win parts of a virtual network.
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• V-Mart promotes truthfulness, with selective information sharing. V-Mart, through
its two stage strategy-proof auction mechanism, ensures that the SP is be free from
price manipulation from the InPs. However, it also ensures that the InPs are able to
participate without disclosing sensitive information (e.g., physical network topology,
physical resource capacity and configurations and pricing model).
• The framework is flexible. A SP enjoys the flexibility to specify the levels of services
he would accept (through RFQs), not select from a pre-specified list. An InP, on the
other hand, is able to employ any business policy (e.g., pricing mechanism) that best
suits his purpose.
• It is incentive compatible for both parties. V-Mart’s auction model and the VN
partitioning algorithms attempt to minimize virtual network provisioning cost for the
SP, but the two-stage, sealed auction model is chosen to guard against cases where the
InPs gain no profit, therefore has no incentive to participate in the market. Moreover,
the VN partitioning algorithms are designed to suit various InP preferences.
• Service Negotiation and Contracting processes are automatic and efficient. The
negotiation process (auction) and the winner determination or contracting decision
process (partitioning algorithm) are automatic and efficient, to allow fast and dynamic
virtual network creation.
• V-Mart is applicable to a wide variety of markets. Although it is designed in the VNE
context, V-Mart’s graph representation, auction processes and partitioning mechanisms
can equally be applied elsewhere. It is suitable for vendor/provider selection in
many service markets including business process outsourcing, cloud computing, VPNs,
P2P services and grids in a multi-providers setting. Practically it can handle any
service which is a combination of other correlated services and the correlation can be
represented as edges in a graph.
5.2 Future Plans
We have the following future plans for this framework.
1. Theoretical Analysis: V-Mart establishes most of its features through quantitative
54
or qualitative analysis. As part of our future work, we intend to take a theoretical
approach to further assess V-Mart. These include
(a) An outline of the proof that the proposed auction model is strategy-proof is
provided in section 3.3. We intend to provide a formal proof of this important
property.
(b) We present the observed approximation factors of V-Mart’s VN partitioning algo-
rithms in chapter 4. In future, we intend to establish theoretical approximation
factors and bounds on the performance of the partitioning algorithms
(c) We plan to evaluate the framework using the following criteria [53]:
i. Social welfare and/or Pareto efficiency: measure the global good of the SP
and the VN bidders in the market.
ii. Individual rationality: evaluate whether each individual (SP or InP) has a
rationale to participate in V-Mart.
iii. Distribution and Communication efficiency: evaluate the overhead of V-Mart.
(d) As another alternative algorithm for the VN partitioning problem, we also intend
to explore available approaches used to directly solve mixed integer programs.
2. Observe real-world performance. The framework was evaluated in an in-house
simulated setting. We plan to evaluate V-Mart in a much larger setting. A possible
option is to simulate the market on PlanetLab. By logically dividing a slice into multiple
domains (InPs), we can simulate a multi-domain VN hosting market. This way we can
evaluate V-Mart under real network load, apply VN embedding algorithms to generate







Simple Genetic Algorithms for VN Partition-
ing
Here we describe our implementation of a simple genetic algorithm, GA-Vanilla. The basic
steps of a simple genetic algorithm are outlined in algorithm 3). The operations in the simple
genetic algorithm: selection, crossover and mutation, are outlined in the following.
Representation Scheme and Fitness Function:
The first step in designing a genetic algorithm is to devise a representation scheme, i.e, a way
to represent individuals in the population, that suits the problem. As a representation scheme
we use a K -ary string of length |I M | that denotes a mapping functionMN , i.e., individual
S = s1s2...s|I M | such that, si =MN(i) = bidder kε{1, 2, ..., K} to which i is assigned.
As the fitness of an individual, we use the inverse of the total cost for the individual or
mapping function, i.e, f i tnes s(S) =
1
C(GM ) , C(G
M) is defined as equation 3.2.
Initial Population:
We randomly select feasible individuals (in line 2 of algorithm 3) to form the initial population,
Pop0 = {S j | jε1, ..., popSize}. Note that a bidder may not always bid for all the islands in
the meta-graph, therefore, any assignment for an island is not guaranteed to be feasible.
A feasible string or individual is one that contains no mapping from an island to a bidder
that has not quoted a price for it. We also insert the two extreme points (MinIslandCost
59
Algorithm 3: A GA for Virtual Network Partitioning
generation← 0;1
old_population← Generate_Initial_Population;2
while gener at ion < MAX_GENERAT ION do3
gener at ion← gener at ion + 14
j ← 1;5
while j <= popSize do6
selected_population = select reproducing population from old_population;7
parent1← random_select( selected_population );8
parent2← random_select( seleted_population );9
crossover( parent1, parent2, child1, child2, probCrossover );10
child1← mutation(child1, probMutation, probRepair);11
child2← mutation(child2, probMutation, probRepair);12
add child1 and child2 to new_population;13




and MinCutSize) from our heuristic-based algorithm into the initial population, as they are
proven to produce good final results.
Reproducing Population Selection Schemes
The parent selection process (line 7) selects individuals from a population who will create
offspring individuals in the following generation. We use the deterministic sampling scheme
[21] for our implementation. In this scheme, each individual has an expected number of
offsprings, calculated as eS j = popSize×
f i tnes s(S j )
∑
jε{1,2,...,popSize} f i tnes s(S j )
, in the following generation.
Each individual is allocated samples equal to the integer part of its expectation. The
population is then sorted using the fractional part of eS j , and the remaining individuals
needed to fill the population are taken from the top of the list. We select this scheme because




Pairs of parents from the selected population produce two offsprings in the next generation
through crossover and mutation. The parents are paired randomly in lines 8 and 9. The
representation that we adopted allows a wide range of standard GA crossover and mutation
operators. In our implementation, we used the one-point crossover [36] operator with
crossover probability probCrosover, and a random crossover point.
Clearly, the crossover operator may produce individuals that are not feasible. Therefore,
we probabilistically repaired the infeasible strings in the mutation operator (lines 11 and
12). We use two different probabilities, probMutation and probRepair. An infeasible mapping
of an island is corrected to a randomly selected feasible one with probability probRepair. We
set high values for this to ensure that the resulting population has a very small section of
infeasible individuals. probMutation, is the probability with which a mapping or character in
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